Competing Beyond Borders: Should Australia Build First, or Export Now?

Is Australia directing their talent toward genuine capability or simply chasing validation from offshore markets? Warwick Brown analyzes Australia's cybersecurity sector critical choice

By Warwick Brown, Technology & Cyber Security Leader & Executive.

Australia’s cybersecurity sector faces a choice that no one wants to name plainly: do we chase global export ambitions before securing the foundations at home, or do we turn inward and build sovereign strength first, accepting short-term limitations in pursuit of long-term credibility?

The instinct is to do both. Government strategies promise world leadership by 2030, industry bodies tout export opportunities, and venture capital circles flirt with the next unicorn. Yet beneath the rhetoric lies an uncomfortable reality: Australia is still figuring out what it wants to be in the global cybersecurity order, and that indecision shapes everything from R&D priorities to alliance commitments.

The question isn’t whether Australia has the talent. It does. The question is whether we’re directing that talent toward genuine capability or simply chasing validation from offshore markets we’re not yet equipped to dominate.

Alliances: Force multiplier or quiet dependency?

AUKUS and Five Eyes are presented as unalloyed advantages, and in many respects they are. Access to allied intelligence, joint R&D programmes, and credibility through association open doors that smaller nations struggle to reach alone. The partnership accelerates technology transfer, aligns cyber doctrines, and positions Australia within the West’s strategic architecture.

But alliances are not neutral. They come with expectations, obligations, and a subtle tilt toward priorities set elsewhere. When AUKUS funding flows into joint cyber capabilities, who determines the research agenda? When intelligence-sharing protocols shape what Australian companies can commercialise, how much sovereignty remains? These aren’t rhetorical provocations; they’re practical realities embedded in every collaborative framework.

Australia benefits enormously from these relationships, yet the trade-off deserves clearer scrutiny. Deep integration with US and UK defence ecosystems risks narrowing Australia’s commercial options, particularly when engaging with Indo-Pacific markets wary of Western alignment. Singapore’s pragmatic multilateralism and India’s sovereign capability push offer contrasting models worth studying.

The point isn’t to reject alliances. It’s to ask whether Australia has negotiated terms that serve national industrial strategy as much as they serve collective security. Trust goes both ways, and so should influence.

R&D infrastructure: public excellence, commercial lag

Australia’s research ecosystem punches above its weight. CSIRO Data61, Defence Science and Technology Group, and leading universities generate world-class cyber research. Government grants support innovation pathways, and collaborative frameworks connect academia with industry.

Yet this excellence rarely translates to commercial dominance. Research outputs become consulting projects or niche applications rather than scalable export products. Intellectual property generated with public funding too often ends up licensed offshore or acquired by foreign firms seeking Australian talent without Australian control.

The gap isn’t capability. It’s commercialisation. Australia builds the science but struggles to package it for global markets, leaving local firms dependent on government contracts while international competitors monetise similar research at scale. This isn’t a failure of researchers; it’s a structural misalignment between how public R&D is funded and how private markets reward innovation.

If export ambitions are genuine, then R&D policy needs rethinking. Sovereign capability demands that publicly funded breakthroughs remain anchored to Australian industry, not simply contribute to global knowledge commons that competitors exploit faster.

Follow the money: who funds what, and why?

Australian cybersecurity R&D relies heavily on government investment, from ASD’s corporate priorities to CSIRO’s innovation programmes. Private venture capital remains shallow and risk-averse, preferring later-stage investments with proven traction. This leaves early-stage innovators dependent on public grants or foreign funding, neither of which prioritises long-term Australian control.

Foreign investment isn’t inherently problematic, but it shapes outcomes. When offshore capital funds Australian startups, exit strategies favour acquisition by international firms rather than scaling locally. When allied defence budgets co-fund research, outputs align with allied strategic needs rather than Australian commercial priorities.

The financing model matters because it determines who captures value. If Australia funds innovation but foreign entities commercialise it, export success becomes someone else’s story. Sovereign capability requires not just smart people and good labs, but patient capital willing to back Australian firms through the messy middle stage where most ventures fail.

Government can catalyse this, but only if policy shifts from innovation theatre to sustained industrial backing. Export ambitions demand more than research grants; they require deliberate capital structures that keep Australian innovation anchored domestically while scaling globally.

Regional realities: the neighbourhood is waking up

While Australia debates its export potential, India and Southeast Asia are building their own cyber ecosystems. India’s cybersecurity market is projected to double by 2032, driven by sovereign capability pushes and rapid digitisation. Singapore continues expanding its Cyber Security Agency and recently established a Digital Defence Hub to coordinate national resilience.

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are investing heavily in national frameworks, with ASEAN collectively developing cyber norms and capacity-building initiatives that position the region as both market and competitor. These aren’t distant developments; they’re immediate regional dynamics reshaping where demand flows and who captures it.

Australia’s geographic position offers natural advantages. Proximity to Asia-Pacific markets, trusted governance, and established research infrastructure create genuine export opportunities. But proximity alone doesn’t guarantee access. If regional neighbours develop self-sufficient cyber capabilities or prefer partnerships with India and Singapore over Australia, the export window narrows quickly.

Engagement matters. Australia’s support for ASEAN cyber strategies and regional capacity-building programmes positions the nation as a collaborative partner rather than a competitor. This soft-power approach builds goodwill and opens commercial pathways that aggressive export pushes might not. The question is whether Australia prioritises this regional collaboration or remains fixated on competing with US and Israeli firms in distant markets where credibility is harder won.

The internal muscle question

Export success doesn’t emerge from thin air. It grows from domestic strength: deep talent pools, mature commercial ecosystems, robust IP protections, and companies battle-tested in demanding home markets. Australia’s cybersecurity sector has elements of this, but gaps remain visible.

Skills shortages persist across government and industry. Regulatory complexity stifles agility. Venture capital depth lags behind competitors. These aren’t obstacles to export; they’re signs that internal capability needs hardening before external ambitions can credibly scale.

The case for building first isn’t defeatism. It’s strategy. Domestic resilience funds export credibility. When Australian firms demonstrate they can secure critical infrastructure at home, offshore buyers take notice. When local universities produce workforce-ready graduates, multinational firms invest. When government procurement prioritises sovereign suppliers, local industry matures faster.

Turning inward doesn’t mean abandoning export ambitions. It means sequencing them properly. Strengthen capability, deepen commercialisation pathways, align financing structures, and then scale outward from a position of genuine strength rather than aspirational positioning.

Choosing a path forward

Australia doesn’t need to replicate Silicon Valley or Tel Aviv. It needs to define what Australian cyber export success looks like on its own terms: trusted, specialised, regionally embedded, and anchored in sovereign capability. That might mean accepting a smaller global footprint in exchange for deeper regional influence. It might mean prioritising defence and critical infrastructure niches over consumer products. It might mean slower growth but stronger foundations.

The current strategy tries to have it all: world leadership ambitions, alliance integration, regional engagement, and rapid commercialisation. This diffusion of focus risks delivering none of them well. Clarity requires choosing: build first, or export now.

The smarter path, arguably, is the former. Harden domestic capability, commercialise public R&D effectively, deepen regional partnerships, and let export success emerge organically from demonstrated strength. The alternative (chasing global markets before internal muscles are built) risks repeating the import dependency that defines Australia’s current position.

Australia’s cybersecurity potential is real. What’s uncertain is whether the nation has the discipline to build deliberately rather than scale prematurely. The choice will determine whether 2030 brings genuine export leadership or just another round of unfulfilled promises.